Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

This book is an introduction to corporate governance - the control and direction of companies by boards, owners, company law, and other mechanisms. The book deals with the mechanisms of governance and how they are combined in different governance systems around the world. Part I is a non-technical overview of governance mechanisms and country models. Part II is an in-depth discussion of some particularly important governance mechanisms - ownership, boards, business ethics, and corporate governance codes. Part III reviews international corporate governance systems - the market based US and UK systems, bank governance in Germany, cross ownership in Japan, and family business in East Asia.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Introduction(p. 9)
• I An Introduction to Corporate Governance(p. 15)
• Chapter 1 What is Corporate Governance?(p. 15)
• What corporate governance is not(p. 16)
• The basic governance problem(p. 17)
• The extended agency problem(p. 18)
• Why is corporate governance important?(p. 21)
• Conclusion(p. 22)
• References(p. 23)
• Chapter 2 Agency Problems and Corporate Governance(p. 25)
• The Owner-manager problem(p. 28)
• Agency theory(p. 31)
• Types of agency problems(p. 31)
• Information problems(p. 32)
• Moral hazard(p. 33)
• Adverse selection(p. 34)
• Alternatives to the agency model(p. 38)
• References(p. 40)
• Chapter 3 The Mechanisms of Governance(p. 41)
• Moral Standards(p. 42)
• Trust and reputation(p. 44)
• Law(p. 45)
• Large owners(p. 49)
• Shareholder pressure(p. 50)
• Boards(p. 50)
• Creditors(p. 51)
• Incentive systems(p. 52)
• Auditors(p. 53)
• Analysts(p. 54)
• Takeovers(p. 54)
• Competition(p. 55)
• The managerial labour market(p. 55)
• Corporate governance codes(p. 55)
• Media pressure(p. 56)
• System effects(p. 57)
• References(p. 57)
• Chapter 4 International Corporate Governance(p. 59)
• Theoretical considerations(p. 60)
• International systems(p. 64)
• Country models(p. 71)
• Convergence(p. 73)
• References(p. 77)
• II Understanding Mechanisms of Governance
• Chapter 5 Understanding Corporate Ownership(p. 85)
• Ownership of the firm(p. 86)
• Ownership structure(p. 87)
• Ownership and performance(p. 89)
• Owner identity(p. 90)
• Best owner(p. 95)
• References(p. 97)
• Chapter 6 What Boards do and Should do(p. 101)
• Introduction(p. 101)
• Board functions: facts and fiction(p. 103)
• The theory of boards(p. 109)
• The empirical evidence(p. 115)
• Empowerment and overload(p. 119)
• Discussion(p. 122)
• References(p. 126)
• Appendix 6.1 The tasks of the board according to the combined code(p. 129)
• Appendix 6.2 (p. 132)
• Chapter 7 Ethics as a Governance Mechanism(p. 135)
• Business ethics as a governance mechanism(p. 136)
• Optimal business ethics(p. 141)
• Actual business ethics(p. 143)
• Discussion(p. 147)
• References(p. 148)
• Chapter 8 Understanding Corporate Governance Codes(p. 151)
• Code puzzles(p. 152)
• Corporate governance codes in theory(p. 154)
• Stylised facts and puzzles(p. 156)
• Statistical evidence on codes(p. 159)
• The contents(p. 161)
• Discussion(p. 165)
• References(p. 167)
• Appendix(p. 170)
• III Understanding International Systems
• Chapter 9 The Anglo-American Market Model and Shareholder Value(p. 173)
• The ideal model: shareholder value(p. 173)
• The market based system: ideal model(p. 176)
• The US model(p. 177)
• The UK corporate governance model(p. 181)
• Evaluating the market model(p. 183)
• References(p. 186)
• Appendix 1 Sarbanes-Oxley(p. 187)
• Chapter 10 Bank Governance in Germany(p. 191)
• Bank governance in theory(p. 191)
• Bank leadership in Germany(p. 194)
• Two-tier boards with employee representation(p. 195)
• Other characteristics of German corporate governance(p. 195)
• Why is Germany different?(p. 196)
• Evaluation of the German model(p. 197)
• References(p. 198)
• Chapter 11 Relational Governance in Japan(p. 199)
• Theoretical considerations(p. 199)
• The Japanese model(p. 200)
• The Keiretsu system(p. 202)
• History of Japanese corporate governance(p. 205)
• Changes in the Japanese model(p. 206)
• Evaluation of the Japanese model(p. 207)
• References(p. 208)
• Chapter 12 Family Business with East Asia as an example(p. 209)
• Family business defined(p. 209)
• The costs and benefits of family ownership(p. 211)
• Family ownership and economic performance(p. 214)
• Family control mechanisms(p. 216)
• Should dual class shares be prohibited?(p. 219)
• Ownership and control in East Asia(p. 219)
• References(p. 223)
• Chapter 13 Corporate Governance in Scandinavia(p. 225)
• Comparative governance(p. 227)
• Evaluating the Scandinavian model(p. 230)
• References(p. 232)
• IV Conclusion
• Chapter 14 Corporate Governance beyond the Hype(p. 237)
• Good corporate governance(p. 239)
• Corporate governance reviews(p. 242)
• Index(p. 245)